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OVEREXTENSION OF ARBITRAL AUTHORITY: PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AND ISSUES OF ARBITRABILITY-Raytheon Co. v.
Automated Business Systems, Inc., 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989)
Abstract: Recently, commercial arbitrators' authority to award a full spectrum of reme-
dies has greatly increased. In Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Systems, Inc., the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed an arbitral award of punitive
damages. The court upheld the award despite the arbitrators' failure to address a pre-
hearing objection to the arbitrability of such sanctions. This Note concludes that courts
should require arbitrators to resolve pre-hearing challenges to their authority and recom-
mends that arbitrators interpret broadly-drafted arbitration clauses to encompass only
traditional contract remedies.
In Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Systems, Inc., I the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that broad arbitra-
tion clauses empower commercial arbitrators to impose punitive sanc-
tions.2 Raytheon challenged an award of punitive damages on two
grounds: first, that the arbitrators were not authorized to grant such
relief, and second, that the arbitrators violated Raytheon's fifth
amendment right to a fair hearing by not expressly declaring the puni-
tive damages claim arbitrable.'
The First Circuit rejected both of Raytheon's arguments. The court
held that broad arbitration agreements authorize the award of exem-
plary damages,' and that, because the arbitrators never prohibited the
submission of evidence, they did not deprive Raytheon of its constitu-
tional right to a fair hearing.5
The Raytheon decision overextends the authority derived from
broad arbitration clauses. Even before Raytheon, arbitrators could
formulate remedies previously confined to the judiciary without com-
mensurate judicial restraints.6 Raytheon increases these powers by
allowing arbitrators to avoid pre-hearing objections to their authority.
Consequently, arbitrators can impose punitive sanctions despite their
disputed powers, and then insulate those awards from judicial review.
1. 882 F.2d 6 (Ist Cir. 1989). Judge Reinhardt, sitting by designation from the Ninth Circuit,
wrote the Raytheon opinion.
2. Id at 12. Broad commercial arbitration clauses provide generally for the resolution of all
disputes without specifying the remedies available. See infra note 12.
3. Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 8. Fundamentally fair arbitration hearings entitle parties to notice
and an opportunity to be heard. Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. North Am. Towing, Inc.,
607 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1979).
4. Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 10.
5. Id at 8.
6. See infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
695
Washington Law Review
The Raytheon court could have limited the arbitrators' authority in
two ways. First, the court could have required that arbitrators define
the scope of their authority prior to any substantive hearings. Second,
the First Circuit could have followed its own labor arbitration prece-
dent and permitted commercial arbitrators to award punitive damages
only when expressly provided for in the arbitration clause.7 Either of
these approaches would discourage arbitrators from exceeding their
authority and protect against unexpected liability.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
In less than twenty years, the use of commercial arbitration8 has
increased over 250%.' This expansion is attributable to arbitration's
procedural and economic efficiency over litigation. Arbitration both
decreases the time and money spent resolving disputes and circum-
vents much of the appellate process."° Arbitration also provides con-
tractual parties with a forum created to accommodate standard
business practices. "
Despite these advantages, broad arbitration clauses' 2 may expose
contractual parties to unexpected liability and remove judicial protec-
tions. The agreements create unintended liability by increasing the
spectrum of available remedies. Under traditional contract doctrine,
parties are only liable for compensatory damages,13 and courts rarely
permit penalties for breach of contract.' 4 Recently, however, some
7. See Bacardi Corp. v. Congreso de Uniones Industriales de Puerto Rico, 692 F.2d 210 (1st
Cir. 1982).
8. "Arbitration is a process by which parties voluntarily refer their disputes to an impartial
third person .... The parties agree in advance that the arbitrator's determination, the award,
will be accepted as final and binding upon them." M. DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION § 1:01 (rev. ed. 1988).
9. Comment, The Scope of Modern Arbitral Awards, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1113, 1113 n.2 (1988)
(quoting R. COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION-WHAT You NEED To KNOW 8-9 (3d ed.
1986)).
10. Id. at 1114. See infra note 20 (discussing statutory restrictions on judicial review).
11. See M. DOMKE, supra note 8, § 2:01 (observing that "arbitration... serves to standardize
business transactions and trade practices and to control the business ethics of the participants").
12. Most broad commercial arbitration clauses follow the American Arbitration
Association's model format: "Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract,
or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Commercial
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award
rendered by the Arbitrator(s) may be entered in any Court having jurisdiction thereof."
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, reprinted in G.
GOLDBERG, A LAWYER'S GUIDE To COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION app. A, 114 (1983)
[hereinafter Rules].
13. S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1338 (3d ed. 1968).
14. This limitation is often justified on two grounds. First, parties should be protected from
overreaching and unfair dealing. Second, penalties are not essential to the agreement itself, but
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courts have interpreted broad arbitration clauses to authorize awards
of punitive, consequential, and liquidated damages, as well as injunc-
tions and prejudgment interest.15 Because such clauses do not specify
that arbitrators can impose non-traditional contract remedies, 16 par-
ties may be unaware that the agreements increase their potential expo-
sure to liability.
If parties do know the extent of their liability, they may still want to
avoid arbitration because it removes judicial protections. Arbitrators
are not subject to procedural and substantive restraints similar to
those that bind the judiciary. For example, arbitrators are not bound
by rules of evidence 7 or by substantive law."8 Their decisions on the
merits are generally not reviewable, even if they commit errors of law
or misinterpret facts. 9 Finally, judicial review of the award itself is
extremely limited,2" leaving parties with little recourse once arbitra-
are in the nature of a security for performance. Note, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: The
Search for a Workable Rule, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 272, 301 (1978). But see Barton, The
Economic Basis of Damages for Breach, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 286-87 (1972) (noting that
preclusion of agreed upon penalties interferes with the voluntary allocation of risks resulting
from breach); Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation
Principle Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L.
REv. 554, 578-93 (1977) (arguing that enforcement of stipulated penalties efficiently insures
against otherwise non-compensable consequences of breach).
15. See, eg., Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir.
1985) (punitive damages allowed); French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784
F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1986) (consequential damages allowed); Harbor Island Spa, Inc. v. Norwegian
Am. Line A/S., 314 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (liquidated damages allowed); Linwood v.
Sherry, 7 A.D.2d 751, 181 N.Y.S.2d 772 (N.Y. App. Div. 1958) (injunction allowed); Sun Ship,
Inc. v. Matson Navigation Co., 785 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986) (prejudgment interest allowed).
16. Rule 43 of the Commercial Arbitration Rules states only that "[tihe Arbitrator may grant
any remedy or relief which the Arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the scope of the
agreement of the parties .... " Rule; supra note 12, at app. A, 119 (emphasis added).
17. See M. DOMKE, supra note 8, § 24:02.
18. See Comment, supra note 9, at 1117-19.
19. Office of Supply, Republic of Korea v. New York Navigation Co., 469 F.2d 377, 379 (2d
Cir. 1972).
20. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) allows judges to vacate an arbitral award only when
the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; when arbitrators exhibit partiality
or corruption or other misconduct; or when arbitrators exceed their powers. 9 U.S.C.A. § 10
(West 1970). Most courts consider the FAA to be the exclusive grounds for vacating or
modifying commercial arbitration awards. See, eg., LaFarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser
Cement & Gypsum Corp., 791 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986); Tamari v. Bache Halsey Stuart
Inc., 619 F.2d 1196, 1198 n.2 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 873 (1980).
The judicial doctrine of "manifest disregard" may provide alternative grounds for vacating
arbitral awards. See, eg., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953). Courts, however, have
narrowly construed this exception. See, eg., Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d
1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972); Trafalgar Shipping Co. v. International Milling Co., 401 F.2d 568,
572-73 (2d Cir. 1968).
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tors render their decisions.21 Thus, when contracts include broad
arbitration clauses, parties both increase potential liability and elimi-
nate procedural protections.
II. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
A. An Historical Perspective
Traditionally, judges were reluctant to enforce arbitration agree-
ments. They perceived arbitration as a threat to the courts' jurisdic-
tion.22 In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) 23 to reverse this common law limitation on arbitration. 24 The
FAA governs written arbitration agreements "in any maritime trans-
action or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce,"
and ensures that these clauses are valid and enforceable.25 Since its
inception, the FAA has provided courts with a foundation from which
to expand the scope of arbitrable issues.2 6
In recent decades, the United States Supreme Court has fostered
this expansion through the liberal construction of arbitration
clauses.27 In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construc-
tion Corp.,28 the Court interpreted the FAA as "a congressional decla-
ration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements. '29
Moses H. Cone created a body of federal substantive law applicable to
any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the FAA.3" One
21. When arbitrators determine the scope of their own authority, that decision is subject to
more intense judicial review. Davis v. Chevy Chase Fin. Ltd., 667 F.2d 160, 166-67 (D.C. Cir.
1981); see infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
22. Despite this judicial hostility, courts still enforced arbitral awards. They refused,
however, to grant specific performance of arbitration agreements, or to stay judicial proceedings
instituted in breach of such agreements. Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public
Interest: The Arbitration Experience, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 251-52 (1987).
23. Pub. L. N. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-15 (West
1970 & Supp. 1989)).
24. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (stating that
Congress' preeminent concern in passing the FAA was to enforce private agreements to
arbitrate).
25. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1970). The FAA does not provide independent federal grounds for
jurisdiction. When application of the FAA is based on commerce, parties must meet the
diversity of citizenship and the jurisdictional amount requirements. Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983).
26. See generally Kanowitz, supra note 22.
27. This judicial expansion first began in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395, 406 (1967), when the Court held that the FAA applied to all contracts involving
interstate commerce.
28. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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year later, in Southland Corp. v. Keating,"' the Court emphasized that
by enacting the FAA, "Congress intended to foreclose state legislative
attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.
32
Thus, courts must resolve questions regarding the scope of such agree-
ments in favor of arbitration, regardless of conflicting state substantive
law.
33
B. Punitive Damages Under the Federal Arbitration Act
A split in authority exists as to whether arbitrators can impose puni-
tive sanctions.34 In the context of labor arbitration, the majority of
state and federal courts rarely permit arbitrators to award exemplary
damages.35 The First Circuit, adhering to the majority rule, has held
that labor arbitrators cannot award punitive damages unless the col-
lective bargaining agreement specifies that remedy.36
Unlike labor arbitration, there is no general consensus in commer-
cial arbitration regarding the award of punitive damages. Some state
courts have barred commercial arbitrators from ever imposing such
sanctions.37 The leading state court case opposing punitive damages
in commercial arbitration is Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. 31 In Garrity,
the New York Court of Appeals ruled that arbitrators cannot award
exemplary damages even when the parties expressly agree to that rem-
edy.39 Applying New York state law, the court held that arbitral
31. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
32. Id. at 16.
33. This rule, however, does not apply to contrary state procedural policies. Volt
Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989).
34. The Supreme Court came close to allowing a punitive award during arbitration in
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). In McMahon, the Court
declared RICO claims arbitrable despite statutory treble damages. The Court, however,
emphasized the remedial rather than the punitive nature of RICO claims. Id. at 240. See
generally Comment, Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: The Unresolved Question of
Pendent State Claims, 37 CATH. U.L. REV. 1113 (1988).
35. See, eg., United Elec., Radio & Machine Workers, Local 1139 v. Litton Microwave
Cooking Prod., 704 F.2d 393, 397 (8th Cir. 1983); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Ry.
Clerks, 657 F.2d 596, 603 (1Ith Cir. 1981); International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 450
v. Mid-Valley, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 1104, 1109 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
Some courts bar all punitive damages in labor arbitration. See, eg., School City of E. Chicago
v. East Chicago Fed'n of Teachers, Local No. 511, 422 N.E.2d 656, 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981);
Publishers' Ass'n v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 280 A.D. 500, 507, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401,
407-08 (1952).
36. Bacardi Corp. v. Congreso de Uniones Industriales de Puerto Rico, 692 F.2d 210 (1st Cir.
1982).
37. See Shaw v. Kuhnel & Assocs., Inc., 102 N.M. 607, 698 P.2d 880 (1985); United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. DeFlniter, 456 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
38. 40 N.Y.2d. 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976).
39. Garrity, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
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awards of punitive sanctions contravened public policy by displacing
the state as arbiter of social sanctions.' Courts and commentators,
however, have criticized the Garrity case for its absolute rejection of
punitive damages awarded during commercial arbitration.4"
In line with these criticisms of Garrity, a minority of state and lower
federal courts permit commercial arbitrators to award punitive dam-
ages even when the contract does not specify that remedy.42 Until
Raytheon, however, the Eleventh Circuit was the only federal court of
appeal to follow this rule.43 In Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v.
Kajima International, Inc.,44 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a trial
court's ruling that commercial arbitrators could impose punitive sanc-
tions.45 The trial court justified the award on three grounds. First, the
court stated that under the FAA, broad arbitration clauses evince an
intent to vest arbitrators with authority to decide virtually any con-
tractual dispute.46 Second, the court concluded that the parties could
have limited the available remedies, but they chose not to restrain the
arbitrator's authority.47 Finally, the trial court rejected the Garrity
rule because it involved state law and state public policy.48 The court
held that neither the FAA nor federal public policy bars arbitrators
40. Id. at 833-34. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Gabrielli argued that the public policy
favoring arbitration outweighs the public policy disfavoring punitive damages "where the
unjustifiable conduct complained of is found to be with malice." Id. at 837.
41. See, e.g., Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353, 364
(N.D. Ala. 1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (determining that the Garrity rule would
"undermine the chief advantages and purposes of arbitration"); Stipanowich, Punitive Damages
in Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. Reconsidered, 66 B.U.L. REV. 953, 959 (1986)
(arguing that "the Garrity doctrine may be seen as an anomaly, frustrating the goals of fairness
and finality that are the essence of arbitration"); see also Note, Punitive Damages in Arbitration:
The Search For a Workable Rule, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 272, 274 (1978); Note, Arbitration: The
Award of Punitive Damages as a Public Policy Question, Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 43
BROOKLYN L. REV. 546, 550 (1976).
42. See, e.g., Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378 (1 1th Cir. 1988); Singer v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., 699 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Peabody v. Rotan Mosle, Inc., 677 F.
Supp. 1135 (M.D. Fla. 1987); Ehrich v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 559 (D.S.D.
1987); Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, 76 N.C. App. 16, 331 S.E.2d 726 (1985).
43. See Bonar, 835 F.2d 1378; Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, 776 F.2d
269 (1lth Cir. 1985).
44. 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala. 1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985).
45. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the case substantially on the basis of the trial court's
analysis. 776 F.2d at 270.
46. Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 355. The court concluded that arbitrators are in a better
position than judges to award punitive damages because they are more familiar with the practice
of a given trade and they know what behavior transgresses the limits of acceptable commercial
practice. Id. at 363.
47. Id. at 357.
48. Id. at 361.
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from considering punitive damages claims.4 9 Three years later, in
Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,50 the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed
that arbitrators can award punitive damages under broad arbitration
agreements.51
III. RAYTHEON CO. V A UTOMA TED BUSINESS SYSTEMS,
INC.
In Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Systems, Inc.,52 the First
Circuit followed the Eleventh Circuit's precedent and held that broad
arbitration clauses empower commercial arbitrators to award punitive
damages. The case involved a dealership contract that Raytheon and
Automated signed in 1978." The contract contained a general arbi-
tration clause providing that "[a]ll disputes arising in connection with
the Agreement shall be settled by arbitration.., conducted according
to the Rules of the American Arbitration Association."54 The parties
also stipulated that California law governed interpretation of the
contract.55
Several years later, a conflict arose and Automated demanded arbi-
tration pursuant to the agreement. Automated alleged that Raytheon
breached the contract, violated the duty of good faith and fair dealing,
and committed a number of fraudulent acts. Automated sought com-
pensatory and consequential damages, as well as punitive sanctions.56
In response to Automated's demand, the American Arbitration
Association assembled a three member panel.57 Raytheon answered
Automated's claim in a memorandum filed the day before hearings
began. Addressing the request for punitive damages, Raytheon
advised the panel that "[t]he arbitration agreement between the parties
does not contemplate that punitive damages may be awarded for
claims arising under the contract and Raytheon does not consent to the
submission of this issue to the panel. '58 Raytheon and Automated pro-
49. Id. at 359-61.
50. 835 F.2d 1378 (11th Cir. 1988).
51. In his concurring opinion, Judge Tjoflat doubted whether punitive damages were
arbitrable because "[p]unitive damages . . . serve the societal functions of punishment and
deterrence; unlike contract remedies, they are not designed to vindicate the parties' contractual
bargain." Id. at 1389.
52. 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989).





58. Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellant at 5, Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882
F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989) (No. 89-1157) (emphasis in original).
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ceeded to arbitrate their dispute, but neither the parties nor the arbi-
trators pursued the punitive damages issue.5 9
One year later, in January 1988, the arbitrators rendered their deci-
sion." The panel found in favor of Automated and awarded $250,000
in punitive damages as part of the total remedy. 61 The arbitrators
neither explained the basis for their ruling, nor discussed the rationale
behind their punitive award.62
Raytheon appealed to the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts, arguing that arbitrators cannot award punitive
damages.63 Affirming the arbitral award, the district court followed
the Eleventh Circuit's precedent in Willoughby and Bonar, and held
that arbitrators can award exemplary damages provided the contract
does not expressly forbid that remedy.' The court did not, however,
address Raytheon's pre-hearing objection to the arbitrability of puni-
tive damages.
Raytheon appealed the district court's decision to the First Circuit,
presenting three arguments regarding the award of punitive damages.
First, the panel failed to publish any findings of fact to support its
award.65 Second, the panel violated Raytheon's right to a fair hearing
by not expressing its intent to arbitrate the punitive damages claim.66
Third, commercial arbitrators, like labor arbitrators, cannot award
exemplary damages without both parties' consent.67
The court dealt summarily with the first two arguments, holding
that arbitrators are not required to publish findings of fact 68 and that
59. Raytheon never presented evidence to contest the punitive damages issue and the
arbitrators "never said anything either way about Automated's claim for punitive damages or
Raytheon's statement that it did not consent to the arbitration of the issue." 882 F.2d at 7.
60. Id.
61. Id. The arbitrators also awarded Automated $408,000 in compensatory damages,
$121,000 in attorneys' fees and $47,000 in expenses. In a counterclaim, Raytheon received
$8700. Id.
62. Because the arbitrators in Raytheon did not issue any findings of fact, it is unclear
whether the punitive damages were based on tort or contract liability. If the penalty was based
on breach of contract, even the Willoughby court would have prohibited such relief. See infra
note 118; supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
63. Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., No. 88-0895-MC, slip op. at 1-2 (D.
Mass. Dec. 6, 1988) (WESTLAW, Federal library, Allfeds file), aff'd, 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989).
Raytheon also argued that the arbitrators based their decision on the wrong contract, and that
the neutral arbitrator acted with partiality. Id. The district court ruled against Raytheon, id. at
5, and the issues were not appealed.
64. Id. at 4.
65. Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 8.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 9.
68. It is well established that arbitrators need not make formal findings of fact or state any
reasons for their awards. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
Vol. 65:695, 1990
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Raytheon received a fair hearing. 69 Concerning the panel's authority
to award punitive damages, the First Circuit did not apply California
law as stipulated in the agreement.7" Instead, because the contract
involved interstate commerce, the court applied the FAA and federal
case law.71 The court concluded that, under federal law, broad arbi-
tration clauses empower arbitrators to award punitive sanctions.72
In Raytheon, the First Circuit joined the Eleventh Circuit in
expanding arbitral authority to fashion remedies not specified in the
parties' contract.73 In so doing, the court declined to follow its own
labor arbitration precedent that allows punitive damages only if enu-
merated in the arbitration clause.74 Explaining its departure from this
precedent, the Raytheon court focused on the beneficial nature of puni-
tive damages in effectively deterring fraudulent conduct. 75 Further,
the court found "no compelling reason to prohibit a party which
proves the same conduct to a panel of arbitrators from recovering the
U.S. 593, 598 (1960); Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 653 F.2d 310, 312 (7th Cir. 1981).
This rule maintains arbitral efficiency by eliminating the time spent drafting opinions.
Unfortunately, this rule also hinders effective judicial review since arbitrators need not articulate
the rationale behind individual awards.
69. Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 8. The court held that no due process violation occurred because
the arbitrators did not "take any action or make any affirmative statements" indicating that they
would not hear the punitive damages claim. Id
70. Under California law, commercial arbitrators may award punitive sanctions only if they
are specifically provided for in the contract. Belko v. AVX Corp., 204 Cal. App. 3d 894, 251 Cal.
Rptr. 557 (1988). Despite the parties' stipulation that California law governed, the Raytheon
court applied the FAA and federal law in determining that arbitrators can award punitive
damages. 882 F.2d at 9. The FAA resolves issues concerning the interpretation and
construction of arbitration clauses. Willis v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 821,
823-24 (M.D.N.C. 1983). Thus, a choice-of-law clause designating ajurisdiction which prohibits
arbitral awards of punitive damages may not prevent arbitrators from awarding that remedy.
The provision determines only the substantive law that arbitrators must apply when deciding
whether the parties' conduct warrants punitive sanctions. Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
835 F.2d 1378, 1387 (11th Cir. 1988).
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees,
109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989), may provide a basis for reconsidering the effect of choice-of-law clauses in
commercial arbitration. The dispute in Volt concerned conflicting state and federal procedural
law. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. The Court, however, indicated a general
willingness to effectuate choice-of-law provisions in arbitration. 109 S. Ct. at 1254-56. One
district court has relied on Volt to enforce choice-of-law clauses provided they are consistent with
the goals of the FAA. Flight Sys. v. Paul A. Laurence Co., 715 F. Supp. 1125, 1127 (D.D.C.
1989). The Raytheon court did not follow this extension of Volt, and distinguished Volt on the
grounds that it did not deal with the scope of arbitration agreements. 882 F.2d at 11-12 n.5.
71. Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 9.
72. Id at 10.
73. Id at 9.
74. See Bacardi Corp. v. Congreso de Uniones Industriales de Puerto Rico, 692 F.2d 210 (1st
Cir. 1982).
75. Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 12.
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same damages" that the judiciary awards.7 6 Like the district court,
however, the First Circuit failed to fully consider Raytheon's pre-arbi-
tration objection to the claim for punitive damages.
IV. THE FIRST CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE REQUIRED THE
ARBITRATORS TO DEFINE THE SCOPE OF
THEIR AUTHORITY
Arbitral authority is contractually created,7 7 and the contracting
parties' intent controls interpretation of their agreement. 8 Parties can
stipulate the available remedies in their arbitration clause,79 and they
are not required to arbitrate any matter beyond the scope of their con-
tract.8° In Raytheon, however, the broadly-drafted arbitration clause
neither included nor excluded a punitive damages provision. The
agreement merely stipulated that all disputes arising under the con-
tract should be settled through arbitration.8"
Although the First Circuit inferred an agreement to arbitrate puni-
tive damages, 82 other evidence suggests a contrary intent. For exam-
ple, both parties stipulated that California law governed the
contract.83 Under California law, arbitrators cannot award punitive
damages absent express authorization in the parties' contract.84 If
there is an inference to be drawn from the contract, it would be that
the parties did not intend to include that remedy. At a minimum, this
ambiguity, combined with Raytheon's objection, should have indi-
cated to the arbitrators that no "meeting of the minds"8 had occurred
on the issue of punitive damages. Upon receiving Raytheon's written
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. North Am. Towing, Inc., 607 F.2d 649, 651
(5th Cir. 1979).
78. See, e.g., Automotive, Petroleum & Allied Indus. Employees Union v. Town & Country
Ford, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 256, 258 (E.D. Mo. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 709 F.2d 509 (8th Cir.
1983).
79. See, e.g., El Hoss Eng'r & Transp. Co. v. American Indep. Oil Co., 289 F.2d 346, 350 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 837 (1961).
80. Davis v. Chevy Chase Fin. Ltd., 667 F.2d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
81. Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir. 1989).
82. Id. at 10.
83. Id. at 7.
84. See supra note 70. Even if the parties knew that the FAA, rather than California law,
governed the available remedies when they entered their contract in 1978, no federal court had
yet allowed commercial arbitrators to award punitive damages. Thus, at the time of the contract,
it is unlikely that either party intended to arbitrate punitive damages claims.
85. "[T]he intent of the parties that arbitration be the exclusive method for the settlement of
disputes arising under the contract must be clearly manifested .... This concept may be best
characterized as 'meeting of the minds,' .... " M. DOMKE, supra note 8, § 5:01.
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objection, 6 and realizing that a viable issue of arbitrability existed, the
panel should have immediately determined the scope of its authority
under the contract. Instead, the arbitrators ignored Raytheon's objec-
tion and imposed punitive sanctions.87
A. Pre-hearing Determinations of Arbitral Authority
The Raytheon court should have required arbitrators to determine
the scope of their authority before considering substantive issues.
Compelling arbitrators to resolve such matters prior to hearings would
have two advantages. First, this requirement would prevent arbitra-
tors from increasing their powers beyond those authorized in the arbi-
tration agreement. When arbitrators determine whether they can hear
an issue,88 the availability of judicial review protects parties from
abuse of arbitral authority.89 The reviewing court must determine for
itself whether the arbitrators exceeded their authority.90 When mak-
ing this finding, the court will uphold the arbitrators' assumption of
jurisdiction only "where the scope of arbitration is 'fairly debatable' or
'reasonably in doubt.' "91 Reviewing courts thereby ensure that arbi-
trators cannot force parties to arbitrate matters unless they are specifi-
cally agreed upon.
86. Raytheon is the first commercial arbitration case in which one party submitted a pre-
hearing objection to the arbitrability of punitive damages. In B. Fernandez & HNOS., S. EN C.
v. Rickert Rice Mills, Inc., 119 F.2d 809 (lst Cir. 1941), the First Circuit addressed an analogous
case in which a party contested the scope of arbitral authority before hearings began. The court
held that "[a] party is never required to submit to arbitration any question which he has not
agreed so to submit," and narrowly construed the contract to limit the arbitrable issues. Id. at
815.
87. As the Raytheon court suggested, Raytheon probably should have insisted that the
arbitrators rule on its objection. 882 F.2d at 8. Raytheon's inaction, however, should not
overshadow the arbitrators' duty to resolve issues of arbitrability because they knew Raytheon
would not actively pursue the dispute. After objecting to Automated's claim for punitive
damages, Raytheon advised the panel that "it would not... brief the issues relating either to the
arbitrator's power to award damages under the terms of the arbitration agreement, or to the
propriety of an award." Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellant at 5, Raytheon Co. v. Automated
Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6 (Ist Cir. 1989) (No. 89-1157).
Nor does the fact that Raytheon completed arbitration indicate that it consented to the panel's
implied decision to arbitrate the matter. When one party objects to the arbitrability of an issue
and does not clearly intend to forego judicial review, the issue is sufficiently preserved for judicial
inquiry. Davis v. Chevy Chase Fin. Ltd., 667 F.2d 160, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
88. Arbitrators are clearly empowered to interpret the boundaries of their authority. See,
e.g., Hahnemann Univ. v. District 1199C, Nat'l Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees, 765
F.2d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 1985) ("The issue of an arbitrator's authority to resolve a dispute properly
before her ... rests in the first instance with the arbitrator").
89. Davis, 667 F.2d at 166-67.




Judicial review is undermined, however, if arbitrators disregard
objections to their authority, as occurred in Raytheon, and then issue
binding awards. Once arbitrators render awards, their actions are sub-
ject to only limited judicial review, 92 as opposed to the more intense
judicial review accorded decisions of arbitrability. Thus, ignoring
objections to arbitral authority dilutes the judicial protections afforded
arbitration participants. Forcing arbitrators to decide the scope of
their authority prevents overextension of arbitral powers and main-
tains judicial oversight of the arbitration process.
Second, requiring arbitrators to define their authority would also
avoid unexpected liability. Under this approach, when disputes over
the scope of arbitral authority arise before hearings begin, arbitrators
would explicitly determine the contractually permitted remedies.
Consequently, parties would know the extent of their potential liability
prior to entering arbitration, thereby enabling them to better evaluate
both their settlement options and their financial exposure.
Requiring arbitrators to define the scope of their authority also has
at least two disadvantages. Such a policy may discourage arbitration
by increasing the costs of dispute resolution. Parties could expend
additional time and resources formulating arbitral authority and con-
testing that authority before arbitration began. The policy also could
lengthen the arbitration process, removing one of the advantages that
arbitration provides in the commercial contract setting.93 Yet these
effects are outweighed by the lack of judicial scrutiny and the unex-
pected liability which result from the Raytheon decision. The better
rule is to require commercial arbitrators to resolve pre-hearing objec-
tions to their authority. This policy would both maintain the judicial
protections afforded arbitration participants and define the parties'
potential liability.
B. Failure to Provide a Fair Hearing
The arbitrators' failure to determine the scope of their authority
also violated Raytheon's fifth amendment right to due process of law.
The fifth amendment entitles all parties in arbitration proceedings to
fundamentally fair hearings.94 In light of the spectrum of remedies
92. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
94. Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. North Am. Towing, Inc., 607 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir.
1979) (quoting Bell Aerospace Co. v. Local 516 UAW, 500 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1974)); see also
Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 263 F. Supp. 488, 492 (C.D. Cal. 1967)
(asserting that "parties have the right to assume that any arbitration hearing... will afford them
the opportunity of presenting all of their material evidence") (emphasis in original).
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available to arbitrators under broad arbitration clauses,95 the Ray-
theon court should have more scrupulously protected this right to a
fair hearing. Because fair hearings require notice and an opportunity
to be heard,9 6 the First Circuit should have held that arbitrators vio-
late the fifth amendment if they disregard pre-hearing challenges to
their authority and then grant the relief in controversy.
When arbitrators do not define the scope of arbitrable issues once
objections arise, the parties have no guidelines to follow for submitting
evidence. This lack of notice impedes the parties' opportunity to be
heard. In Hoteles Condado Beach v. Union de Tronquistas Local
901,97 the First Circuit affirmed that denial of the right to be heard is
grounds for vacating arbitral awards. The court in Hoteles Condado
Beach held that an arbitrator's refusal to consider a trial transcript
was "so destructive of [the Company's] right to present [its] case, that
it warrants the setting aside of the arbitration award." 98 The arbitra-
tor in Hoteles Condado Beach never actively prevented any party from
introducing evidence. Nevertheless, the court held that the arbitra-
tor's failure to ascribe significance to the testimony violated the plain-
tiff's opportunity to be heard.99
Like the arbitrator in Hoteles Condado Beach, the arbitrators in
Raytheon failed to provide a fair hearing. In Raytheon, however, the
arbitrators did more than ignore the evidence one party submitted.
Instead, they undermined Raytheon's opportunity to submit evidence
by violating its right to notice of arbitrable issues.1" The First Circuit
upheld the arbitrators' conduct on the theory that Raytheon should
have known the arbitrators would consider punitive damages when
Automated "introduced... evidence which, if believed, supported the
award of punitive damages."101 The court's statement, however, does
not indicate that Automated expressly argued for punitive damages
95. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
96. Totem Marine 607 F.2d at 651; see also Hoteles Condado Beach v. Union de Tronquistas
Local 901, 763 F.2d 34, 38 (1st Cir. 1985) (observing that "the arbitrator's role is to resolve
disputes... once the parties to the dispute have had a full opportunity to present their cases").
97. 763 F.2d 34 (Ist Cir. 1985).
98. Id. at 40 (quoting Hoteles Condado Beach v. Union de Tronquistas Local 901, 588 F.
Supp 679, 685 (D.P.R. 1984), aff'd, 763 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1985)).
99. Id.
100. No due process violation would have occurred if Raytheon had contested the punitive
damages claim during arbitration. Once a party voluntarily submits a claim to arbitration, it
cannot await the outcome and then, if the decision is unfavorable, challenge the arbitrators'
authority. See Ficek v. Southern Pac. Co., 338 F.2d 655, 657 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 988 (1965); see also Comprehensive Accounting Corp. v. Rudell, 760 F.2d 138, 140 (7th Cir.
1985).
101. Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 7 (Ist Cir. 1989).
Washington Law Review
during the hearing, but merely that it submitted evidence supporting
its tort allegations. This evidence, absent an argument for exemplary
damages, did not provide Raytheon with adequate notice that the arbi-
trators might award such relief. Because Raytheon failed to receive
proper notification, it did not actively contest Automated's punitive
damages claim. °2 Therefore, the arbitrators' silence deprived Ray-
theon of notice that the panel would arbitrate the claim and, conse-
quently, of the opportunity to present relevant evidence. 103
Construing the right to a fair hearing to include such notice would
ensure that parties are made aware of all arbitrable issues. At least
one other federal court, however, would be reluctant to extend the
fundamental fairness doctrine to encompass the situation in Raytheon.
In Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc. v. Ellis, " 4 the Sev-
enth Circuit held that commercial arbitrators provided a fair hearing
to a party who "was never precluded from presenting whatever argu-
ments and evidence he wished to present."1 °5 In Moseley, the arbitra-
tors bifurcated the arbitration proceedings.106 The appellant later
claimed that the bifurcation prevented him from submitting evidence
regarding his liability, thus depriving him of procedural due pro-
cess. ' 7 The court found that no due process violation occurred
because the arbitrators subsequently received evidence on the matter
and "all parties were adequately apprised of the shift in
procedures."10
8
Raytheon, however, involved a greater interference with the parties'
rights than occurred in Moseley. In Raytheon, the panel failed to
advise either party that it intended to arbitrate the punitive damages
claim, and Raytheon did not introduce evidence regarding that issue.
Also unlike Moseley, the Raytheon decision upheld an award of dam-
ages beyond the parties' express agreement. Arguably, the arbitrators'
action in Raytheon was more intrusive on the right to a fair hearing.
The lack of notice in Raytheon, combined with expanding arbitral
authority to devise damages, justifies extending the fundamental fair-
102. Id.
103. The court in Raytheon further justified the arbitrators' silence based on Raytheon's
perfunctory treatment of the punitive damages claim. Referring to Raytheon's one sentence
objection, the court stated that "it is not at all surprising that the arbitrators did not comment on
the matter." Id. at 8. Apparently, the court forgot that Automated's claim for punitive damages
was itself only a "single sentence in one of its claims for relief." Id. at 7.
104. 849 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1988).
105. Id. at 268.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (emphasis added).
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ness doctrine to include situations where arbitrators fail to reveal their
intent to hear contested issues. To provide for constitutionally fair
proceedings, arbitrators should announce all decisions regarding pre-
hearing objections to the scope of their authority.
V. BROADLY-DRAFTED ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
SHOULD NOT EMPOWER COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATORS TO AWARD PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
A. The First Circuit Should Have Followed Its Bacardi Precedent
Because arbitrators must interpret arbitration agreements to deter-
mine the scope of their authority, they need rules of construction for
broadly-drafted clauses. The Raytheon court held that such agree-
ments evince an intent to arbitrate punitive damages.109 The First Cir-
cuit, however, could have prevented this extension of arbitral
authority by following its own labor precedent. In Bacardi Corp. v.
Congreso de Uniones Industriales de Puerto Rico,110 the First Circuit
held that labor arbitrators cannot award punitive damages when "the
award [does] not draw its essence from the collective bargaining agree-
ment." ' 1 Unless the arbitration clause expressly authorizes punitive
damages, labor arbitrators are not empowered to award that relief.
In an effort to prevent arbitrators from awarding remedies not con-
tractually specified, Raytheon argued that the Bacardi rationale
should apply to commercial arbitration proceedings.1 12 The First Cir-
cuit rejected Raytheon's proposal because the "concerns which may
warrant such a rule in the labor arbitration field are not present in the
commercial arbitration context," and declined to follow its own labor
arbitration precedent. 11
The Raytheon court's rejection of the Bacardi precedent fails for
two reasons. First, the policies behind punitive awards in labor and
commercial arbitration are not contrary. The Raytheon court
attempted to distinguish labor arbitration from commercial arbitration
on the grounds that the former is one aspect of a continuing working
relationship, while the latter is a one-time endeavor.' 14 The funda-
109. Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1989).
110. 692 F.2d 210 (1st Cir. 1982).
111. Id. at 214.
112. Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 10.
113. Id at 10-11.
114. Id at 10. The court relied on the landmark decision in United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578, 581 (1960), where Justice Douglas observed that
commercial arbitration is a substitute for litigation, while labor arbitration is a substitute for
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mental concerns with subjecting parties to punitive awards, however,
remain whether the contractual relationship is continuous or limited
in duration. In both situations, parties risk exposure to punitive sanc-
tions that are not evident from the arbitration agreement, and they
lack substantial protections from abuse of arbitral authority.1 15
Courts can alleviate these dangers in both the labor and the commer-
cial contexts by mandating that arbitrators award exemplary damages
only when the contract expressly grants that remedy.
Second, although the First Circuit ostensibly rejected the analogy
between labor arbitration and commercial arbitration, the commercial
arbitration precedent cited by the court relied extensively on labor
cases. 16 Contrary to the Raytheon court's statement, courts and com-
mentators frequently cite labor precedents with approval in commer-
cial arbitration situations.17 The First Circuit's invocation of the
labor-commerce dichotomy, then, fails to justify its departure from the
Bacardi rationale.
B. The Bacardi Rationale Facilitates the Arbitration Process
The Raytheon court should have followed the Bacardi precedent
and permitted commercial arbitrators to award punitive damages only
when the arbitration clause specifically grants that relief. This rule is
preferable to allowing punitive sanctions absent an express prohibition
for three reasons. First, the parties' contractual expectations are bet-
ter accommodated. Exemplary damages are not allowed in a typical
contract, and courts will usually refuse to enforce penalties upon
industrial strife. The concept of a continuing relationship in labor settings, however, is merely an
additional rationale, rather than the exclusive justification, for limiting punitive damages in labor
disputes.
115. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
116. The trial court in Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp
353 (N.D. Ala. 1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (1 lth Cir. 1985), referred to labor cases approximately
forty times throughout its opinion. The court in Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d
1378 (1 1th Cir. 1988), which relied almost exclusively on the Willoughby decision, cited three
labor arbitration cases. Despite its rejection of the labor arbitration analogy, even the Raytheon
court cited a labor case to conclude that commercial arbitrators need not present formal findings
of fact. 882 F.2d at 8.
117. See, e.g., Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus. Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1130 (3d Cir. 1972)
(noting that "the principles governing labor and commercial arbitration cases are similar"); M.
DOMKE, supra note 8, § 1:02 (acknowledging that "both labor and commercial arbitration
provide important points of reference, one for the other"); Note, Punitive Damages in
Arbitration: The Search For a Workable Rule, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 272, 291-92 (1978)
(observing that "[clourts should not ignore doctrines developed in the labor context when asked
to enforce 'commercial' arbitration awards").
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breach. 18 The prohibition against punitive awards prevents parties
from incurring unbargained for liability,119 and the mere inclusion of a
broad arbitration clause should not negate this protection. Further, if
parties must explicitly confer the authority to award punitive dam-
ages, they can better predict and prepare for the economic impact of
such sanctions.
Second, the Bacardi rationale facilitates drafting arbitration clauses.
As the protections afforded arbitration participants decrease and arbi-
tral authority to award remedies expands, more parties will draft indi-
vidualized arbitration agreements. 1 0 Parties can better formulate the
authority they intend to grant arbitrators through the inclusion of
available awards, rather than the exclusion of all potential remedies.
The Bacardi approach permits. parties to accurately convey their
intentions and, consequently, to protect their interests. 21 Under this
rule, arbitration would remain an attractive alternative to litigation.
Broad clauses, such as those recommended by the American Arbitra-
tion Association, 122 would still encompass a wide range of arbitrable
issues. The available relief under such agreements, however, would be
limited to that traditionally allowed in contract situations. If parties
do wish to submit to unorthodox contract remedies, the majority of
courts would honor that choice.1 23
Finally, allowing arbitrators to award only traditional contract rem-
edies under broad arbitration clauses limits excessive arbitral author-
ity. Because arbitration removes many of the protections available to
litigants, courts should not expand arbitral powers beyond the con-
straints of the parties' contract. Although arbitrators must impose
binding remedies for arbitration to succeed as an alternative to litiga-
118. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Even the Eleventh Circuit in Willoughby
Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 776 F.2d 269, 270 n.1 (11th Cir. 1985),
acknowledged that "punitive damages of course may not be received for pure breach of
contract"
119. As the Seventh Circuit observed in Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union
No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1164 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985), "arbitrators are
rarely thought authorized to award punitive damages. It is not the kind of remedy that the
parties probably would have agreed to authorize if they had thought about the matter, because of
the great power it would give the arbitrator."
120. As one commentator explained, "[i]ncreased authority vested in arbitrators is a powerful
incentive for parties to draft the narrowest possible arbitration agreements rather than those
broad in scope." Comment, supra note 9, at 1113.
121. If a dispute later arises which the parties did not provide for in the arbitration
agreement, they can still resort to litigation. Parties who include limited arbitration clauses do
not waive their right to judicial hearings on the merits of disputes not encompassed within the
agreement. Davis v. Chevy Chase Fin. Ltd., 667 F.2d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
122. See supra note 12.
123. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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tion, they do not need the inherent capacity to award all forms of
relief. Rather, courts should balance arbitrators' implied authority
under general arbitration agreements against the expectations and
intent of contracting parties.1 24 Limiting unorthodox contract reme-
dies to the express consent of all parties decreases the potential for




Following the First Circuit's decision in Raytheon, parties entering
into broad commercial arbitration agreements expose themselves to
excessive arbitral powers. Once hearings begin, arbitrators can disre-
gard objections to their authority and then impose binding, punitive
sanctions despite their disputed status. In an effort to preserve judicial
protections and to prevent arbitrators from awarding non-traditional
contract remedies, parties would draft narrow arbitration agreements.
As negotiations over the scope of arbitral authority increased, how-
ever, the economic efficiency of arbitration would decline.
The First Circuit could have avoided these consequences by man-
dating that arbitrators expressly resolve challenges to their authority
before beginning substantive hearings. This requirement not only
ensures judicial scrutiny, but also protects parties from incurring
unexpected liability. In addition, as a guide to construing their
authority under broad arbitration clauses, commercial arbitrators
should award extraordinary contract remedies, such as punitive dam-
ages, only when expressly authorized in the contract. This rule both
maintains the advantages of commercial arbitration and protects legit-
imate expectations and interests.
Douglas R. Davis
124. In Complete Interiors, Inc. v. Behan, No. 88-922, slip op. at 2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 4,
1990) (WESTLAW, State Library, Allstates file), the Florida District Court of Appeals held that
commercial arbitrators cannot award punitive damages absent an express provision authorizing
such relief. In rejecting both Bonar and Willoughby, the court reasoned that "[c]ontracting
parties do not normally agree to assess exemplary damages for a breach of contract ...
Contractual consent to so drastic a remedy for simple breach cannot be implied." Id. at 3
(quoting International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Mid-Valley, Inc., 347 F. Supp 1104, 1109
(S.D. Tex. 1972)).
125. One negative aspect of this proposal is that it may increase litigation. If parties do not
provide for punitive damages in their arbitration agreement, and a tort claim later arises, parties
seeking punitive awards may turn to the courts. In the rare situations where parties are pre-
contractually concerned with tort liability, appropriate provisions should be made in the
arbitration clause itself. Litigating an issue, however, is preferable to allowing arbitrators to
impose punitive sanctions when they were never granted that authority.
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